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THE SOUTH CAROLINA IMPLIED CONSENT LAW:
THE 'BREATHALYZER" AND THE BAR
JoEL EDwAnn GoTTiae*
Attorneys who plan to represent clients on charges of driving
under the influence should restudy their chemistry as well as
their law. On February 2, 1970, fifty-seven "Breathalyzers"
were placed in key locations throughout the state' and the Im-
plied Consent Law,2 passed some seven months earlier," became
effective. Although an increase in convictions for driving under
the influence of alcohol may result,4 the primary purpose of the
new law is to deter potential "drunk drivers" and thereby reduce
the number of traffic accidents and fatalities.
Although thought by many to be a general term describing all
breath-testing devices, the "Breathalyzer" is the brand name for
a specific machine. It has been chosen for use in South Carolina
in preference to the many other devices available. The develop-
ment of the "Breathalyzer", as well as the other machines,
stemmed from an application of Henry's Law6 which made it
possible to determine a ratio of the amount of alcohol in the
aveolar (deep-lung) breath to the amount of alcohol in the blood.
7
When a subject blows into a "Breathalyzer," a known amount of
aveolar breath is trapped in a cylinder. A piston then forces the
breath sample into a test ampoule containing a dichromate
solution. The oxidation of any alcohol in the solution causes a
color change in the test ampoule which is measured by compax-
*A.B., University of South Carolina; J.D., University of South Carolina.
Assistant Attorney General, State of South Carolina.
1. The machines have been located so that a person will seldom have to be
taken more than twenty miles to a "Breathalyzer" station.
2. S. C. CODE AmN. § 46-344 (Supp. 1969).
3. The Implied Consent Law was passed June 19, 1969.
4. See generally Hunvald, Whatever Happened to Implied Consent? A
Sounding, 33 Mo. L. REv. 323 (1968).
5. Some of the other breath-testing devices are:
(1) the drunkometer, (2) alcometer, (3) portable intoximeter,
(4) photo-electric intoximeter, (5) DPC Intoximeter, (6) breath-
tester, (7) Kitagawa-Wright Apparatus.
6. Henry's Law states:
[W]hen a volatile substance is dissolved in a liquid, a predictable
amount of the volatile substance will escape into still air which is
in intimate contact with the liquid. Watts, Some Observations on
Police-Administered Tests for Intoxication, 45 N.C.L. Rxv. 35, 56
(1966).
7. One millimeter of blood will contain the same amount of alcohol as
2,100 millimeters of breath.
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ing it to a standard ampoule. A photovoltaic cell is mounted
behind each ampoule and a light bulb on a moveable rack is
located between them. As the color of the test ampoule fades, the
light moves toward the standard ampoule. The machine then
measures the distance the light has moved and calibrates it into
a blood-alcohol percentage. This light must be balanced before
the test is begun in order to achieve accurate results.
The "Breathalyzer" is simple to operate, making it possible
for an operator to obtain accurate readings after a minimal
amount of training. Its design is such that most operating
errors will cause a lower reading in the defendant's favor.8
I. WHEN THE TEST IS ADmINISTERED
A person arrested for driving under the influence will still be
charged with a violation of section 46-343 of the South Carolina
Code. This section makes it illegal for a person to drive a
vehicle anywhere within the state while under the influence of
alcohol." The Implied Consent Law, section 46-344, is limited,
however, in its application to offenses committed on the public
highways. Furthermore, section 46-344 does not actually make
driving under the influence an offense; it merely describes the
procedures to be followed when the "Breathalyzer" is used.
A person who operates a motor vehicle upon a public highway
of South Carolina, by implication, gives his consent10 to a chemi-
cal test of his breath1 ' if he has been arrested for an offense
arising out of acts allegedly committed while driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. In other words, the arresting
officer must have grounds for an arrest and must make the
8. See Watts, Some Observations on Police-Administered Tests for Intoxi-
cation, 45 N.C.L. REv. 35, 64 (1966).
9. The section applies to driving under the influence of not only alcohol
but also "narcotic drugs, barbiturates, paraldehydes, or drugs, herbs or any
other substance of like character. . . ." S. C. CODE ANN. § 46-343 (1962). The
Implied Consent Law, however, applies only to alcohol.
10. The "consent" shall not be deemed to have been withdrawn if the de-
fendant is unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusal, S. C. CODE ANN.
§ 46-344(c) (Supp. 1969). This section conforms with Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432 (1957) in which a conviction based on evidence acquired from
a blood test which was administered to an unconscious person was upheld.
The Court said that "the absence of conscious consent, without more, does not
necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional right. . . ." 352
U.S. at 435.
11. "Consent" is given only for one test and "[n]o person shall be required
to submit to more than one test for any one offense for which he has been
charged.... ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-344(a) (Supp. 1969).
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actual arrest before the test is administered. 12 The machine is
not to be used for the purpose of furnishing the initial probable
cause necessary to make a lawful arrest.
The law apparently does not make it mandatory that a breath
test be administered in all arrests, although this point is de-
batable?.3 It does establish, however, guidelines which must be
followed if the officer who apprehended the defendant directs
that the test be given. As a practical matter it would be difficult
to obtain a conviction in a case in which a test might have been
administered but was not.
The law specifically provides that the test shall not be ad-
ministered by the arresting officer. This prohibition may pre-
sent a question as to who is an "arresting officer" within the
meaning of the act. The purpose of the restriction apparently is
to reduce the chance of having a biased person operate the
machine. The officer who actually made the arrest is in charge
of the case and could, therefore, be more desirous of obtaining a
higher reading. To what extent the courts will go in interpret-
ing what constitutes an "arresting officer" remains to be seen.
14
II. RIGHT TO AN ADDITIONAL TEST
The law provides that:
The person tested may have a physician, qualified
technician, chemist, registered nurse or other qualified
person of his own choosing conduct a test or tests in ad-
12. Section 46-344 (a) provides in part as follows:
(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent to a
chemical test of his breath for the purpose of determining the alco-
holic content of his blood if arrested for any offense arising out of
acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
S. C. CoDE ANN. § 46-344 (a) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
13. The law requires that "[t]he test shall be administered at the direction
of a law enforcement officer who has apprehended [the] person. . . ." S. C.
CODE ANN. § 46-344(a) (Supp. 1969). Does this mean that the test shall be
administered in each case or does it require the test only when the officer so
directs? It is submitted that the test is discretionary with the officer. The
Legislature realized that it would take almost a year after the passage of the
Act to train operators and to implement the law. To argue that the Legis-
lature intended that the test be mandatory would further dictate that the
Legislature intended to do away with all "driving under the influence" cases
until operators were certified and the machines in operation.
14. If two officers were on patrol together and one made the arrest while
the other assisted, the court may consider both to have been "arresting
officers." The question may also arise when several officers are in pursuit
of the same individual.
1970]
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dition to the test administered by the law enforcement
officer. The failure or inability of the person tested to
obtain an additional test shall not preclude the admis-
sion of evidence relating to the test taken at the direc-
tion of the law enforcement agency or officer.
The arresting officer or the person conducting the
chemical test of the person apprehended shall promptly
assist that person to contact a qualified person to con-
duct additional tests."'
This provision creates several questions 16 that eventually will
have to be answered by the courts. For example, how much as-
sistance must be given toward contacting a qualified person?
Does the statute contemplate merely a phone call or does it re-
quire that transportation to a medical facility be furnished?
What effect will a substantial delay have on the credibility of an
additional test?17 Assuming that adequate assistance is not fur-
nished or that the officer actually refuses to allow the defendant
to try to get an additional test, will the admissibility of the
"Breathalyzer" results be affected or would the conduct of the
officer merely affect the weight of such evidence? The statute
does not give a clear answer, and it is difficult to predict
whether the court would adopt an exclusionary rule. It is
obvious, however, that the Legislature intended for the de-
fendant to have the right to have an additional test administered
and also to have the assistance of law enforcement personnel in
obtaining such a test.'8 In State v. Ball, 9 the Supreme Court of
Vermont said in discussing the refusal to an additional test:
If the careful structure of protection for the drinking
driver erected by the legislature is to have any vitality,
prosecutors ought not to be able to avoid its strictures
15. S. C. CODE ANN. § 46-344(a) (Supp. 1969).
16. See S.C. CoDn ANN. § 46-344(g) (Supp. 1969). Questions involving
doctor-patient privileges should not arise in South Carolina since there is no
such recognized privilege. Peagler v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 232 S.C. 274,
101 S.E.2d 821 (1958). In any event this section specifically requires that the
person conducting the additional test furnish a copy of a report showing the
time, type, and results of the test to the officer. For further discussion of the
doctor-patient privilege, see also R. DoNiGAx, CH E IcAL TESTS AND THE LAW,
at 106-12 (2d ed. 1966).
17. The average rate of elimination of alcohol from the system is .0151% per
hour, The courts will probably allow interpretive testimony of an expert to
show what the result of the additional test would have been had it been
administered at the same time as the breath test. See People v. Holmes, 2
Mich. App. 283, 139 N.W.2d 771 (1966).
18. An interesting question that may soon arise is whether the defendant
must be advised of his right to an additional test.
19. 123 Vt. 26, 179 A.2d 466 (1962).
[Vol. 2
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while gaining the advantages of its presumptions. It
cannot be supposed that the legislature deliberately
enacted a statute intending it to be so easily circum-
vented.2
0
III. S= INCRIM ATION
Shortly after its famous Miranda2 ' decision, the United States
Supreme Court heard the case of Schrerber v. Califo ia22 and
upheld a driving under the influence conviction based on a blood
test administered despite defendant's refusal, on the advice of
counsel, to consent to the test. In that case the test was ad-
ministered to the defendant without a search warrant while
defendant was at a hospital receiving treatment for injuries.
The trial court admitted the test results over defendant's objec-
tion that the test violated his fourteenth amendment right to
due process, 23 his sixth amendment right to counsel, 24 his fourth
amendment protection from unreasonable searches, 25 and his
fifth amendment privileges against self-incrimination.
In disposing of petitioner's contention that his privilege
against self-incrimination had been violated the Court said:
20. Id. at 29, 179 A.2d at 469.
21. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
23. The Court relied on Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) in
disposing of the due process claim. In that case the Court concluded that a
test administered in a proper manner is not "conduct that shocks the con-
science" nor was it offensive to a "sense of justice" as described in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
24. The Court, in rejecting defendant's right to counsel claim, said:
This conclusion [that the test was not communicative or testi-
monial] also answers petitioner's claim that in compelling him to
submit to the test in view of the fact that his objection was made
on the advice of counsel he was denied his Sixth Amendment right
to the assistance of counsel. Since petitioner was not entitled to
assert the privilege, he has no greater right because counsel er-
roneously advised him that he could assert it. His claim is strictly
limited to the failure of the police to respect his wish, reinforced
by counsel's advice, to be left inviolate. Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 765-66 (1966).
25. The Court acknowledged the fact that the blood test plainly constituted
a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
question to be answered, therefore, was whether the "intrusion" was justifiable
under the circumstances, and whether reasonable procedures were employed in
taking the blood. In recognizing that the blood-alcohol percentage begins to
diminish shortly after the drinking stops and that there was therefore no time
to secure a warrant, the Court concluded that the chemical test was an ap-
propriate incident to the arrest. The Court did, however, limit the scope of
its holding by saying that because "the Constitution does not forbid the States
minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions
in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions
under other conditions." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
1970]
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[T]he privilege protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise pro-
vide the State with evidence of a testimonial or com-
municative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood
and use of the analysis in question in this case did not
involve compulsion to these ends.26
The fifth amendment does not require the exclusion of a de-
fendant's body as evidence when it may be material27 and "that
compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real
or physical evidence' does not violate it.'
'28
Regardless of the absence of fifth amendment protection con-
cerning chemical tests, the Implied Consent Law provides that
the defendant must be advised, prior to the test, that "he does
not have to take the test but that his privilege to drive will be
suspended or denied if he refuses ... .7,29 If defendant then
refuses 0 to submit to the test his license will be suspended by the
highway department for ninety days regardless of the outcome
of the later trial31 Section 46-344(e) does provide for an ad-
ministrative appeal limited to the three following issues:
1. Whether the accused was placed under arrest;
2. Whether the accused had been informed of his right
to refuse the test and the consequences of that re-
fusal;
3. Whether he refused to submit to the test.
32
The ninety-day suspension is, in essence, for failure to co-
operate and, therefore, is not a moving violation to which points
26. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
27. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
28. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
29. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-344(a) (Supp. 1969).
30. A qualified refusal (i.e. refusal to take the test until the subject can
talk to a doctor) will probably constitute a refusal. See Note, The South Da-
kota Implied Consent Statute Reviewed, 14 S.D.L. Rlv. 376 (1969).
31. The suspension is valid even though defendant is later acquitted. But
see Collins v. Hiette, 125 N.W.2d 453 (N.D. 1963), holding that suspension
would be illegal if the defendant were acquitted, because the arrest would be
illegal. This is most definitely a minority rule. One argument that might be
raised in a situation where the defendant has pleaded guilty to a DUI charge
is that the entire purpose of the test is to facilitate prosecution on this charge.
Since the guilty plea renders the test unnecessary the requirement to take the
test should be ruled inapplicable. See Groff v. Rice, 20 Ohio App. 2d 309, 253
N.E.2d 318 (1969).
32. Consent is not deemed to be withdrawn if the defendant is incapable
of refusal. See note 10 supra. If intoxication is admitted or proven the de-
fendant may, thereafter, be able to show that his condition rendered him in-
capable of refusal. Groff v. Rice, 20 Ohio App. 2d 309, 253 N.E.2d 318 (1969).
(Vol. 22
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attach. If the defendant is acquitted of charges of driving under
the influence of alcohol, a permanent record of the suspension
will not be kept, and it will not come under the requirements of
the Financial Responsibility Act.33 The suspension should not,
therefore, affect defendant's insurance rates.
34
If the defendant refuses the test and is subsequently convicted,
the six-month suspension resulting from the conviction35 will be
added on to the ninety-day suspension resulting in a total
suspension of nine months. At first glance it might appear that
the best advice an attorney could give a client would be to
refuse the test and only receive a three month suspension. 6 The
theory of this approach would, of course, be that conviction
would be unlikley without the chemical test as evidence. How-
ever evidence of defendant's refusal to submit to the test, which
if used properly may compensate for the lack of the chemical
test evidence, was held to be admissable in the case of State v.
SMith.37 In that case the South Carolina Supreme Court said:
[A] ppellant's constitutional rights were not violated by
admitting testimony of his failure to submit to a chemi-
cal test designed to measure the alcoholic content of his
blood. Since the testimony was admissible, it was
proper for the attorney for the respondent to comment
to the jury upon the appellant's refusal to submit to
the chemical test of his blood."38
The rationale of the court was that chemical tests were of the
nature of physical evidence and not utterances which would
bring it within the coverage of self-incrimination protections.
Since the test was not self-incriminating, neither would be the
refusal.
Whether the Smith case will withstand constitutional assaults
is questionable. It is true that the chemical test affords physical
evidence and not evidence of a communicative or testimonial
nature. Thus, the test itself is not self-incriminating in the con-
33. S. C. CODE ANN. § 46-735 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
34. S. C. CODE ANN. § 46-344(h) (Supp. 1969). The subject who is not
convicted shall not be required to file proof of insurance.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-348 (Supp. 1969). This section provides that there
shall be a six-month suspension for a first offense, a one-year suspension for a
second offense, and a two-year suspension for a third.
36. This suspension involves no fine nor should it substantially affect one's
insurability. Also there is no "second offense" of refusing to submit to the
test. Each refusal carries a ninety-day suspension.
37. 230 S.C. 164, 94 S.E.2d 886 (1956).
38. Id. at 173, 94 S.E.2d at 890.
1970]
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stitutional sense,39 but this, at least arguably, does not hold true
in the case of a refusal. The refusal requires either a statement
or conduct which is of a communicative nature and is indicative
of the state of mind of the defendant. Use of the defendant's
refusal to infer guilt could be interpreted as a violation of his
right against self-incrimination. In fact, the United States
Supreme Court in Schmerber seemed to suggest that a refusal to
submit to such tests might be constitutionally protected.40
IV. RiGHT To COUNSEL
Since chemical test results are not self-incriminating, it should
follow that the Miranda warnings, to the extent that they are
geared to protecting one's privilege against self-incrimination,
would not be a necessary prerequisite to the administration of
the breathalyzer test. But what about the defendant's right to
counsel, which is also included in the Miranda warning. The
question has not yet arisen in South Carolina, nor has it been
answered by the United States Supreme Court.41 The court
decisions of other states vary, but most hold that defendant does
39. Evidence must be of a testimonial or communicative nature to fall
within the scope of the constitutional protection against self-incrimination.
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
40. The Court in Schnerber said:
This conclusion would not necessarily govern had the State tried
to show that the accused incriminated himself when he was told
that he would have to be tested. Such incriminating evidence may
be an unavoidable by-product of the compulsion to take the test4
especially for an individual who fears the extraction or opposes
it on religious grounds. If it wishes to compel persons to submit
to such attempts to discover evidence, the State may have to
forego the advantage of any testimonial products of administering
the test-products which would fall within the privilege. Indeed,
there may be circumstances in which the pain, danger, or severity
of an operation would almost inevitably cause a person to prefer
confession to undergoing the "search," and nothing we say today
should be taken as establishing the permissibility of compulsion in
that case. But no such situation is presented in this case.
Petitioners have raised a similar issue in this case, in connection
with a police request that he submit to a "breathalyzer" test of air
expelled from his lungs for alcohol content He refused the re-
quest, and evidence of his refusal was admitted in evidence without
objection. He argues that the introduction of this evidence and a
comment by the prosecutor in closing argument upon his refusal
is ground for reversal under Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609.
We think general Fifth Amendment principles, rather than the
particular holding of Griffin, would be applicable in these circum-
stances; see Miranda v. Arizona, ante, at p. 30, p. 37. Since trial
here was conducted after our decision in Malloy v. Hogan, supra,
making those principles applicable to the States, we think peti-
tioner's contention is foreclosed by his failure to object on this
ground to the prosecutor's question and statements. 384 U.S. at
765, n. 9 (1966).
41. See note 8, vipra.
[Vol. 22
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not have an absolute right to counsel before deciding whether
to submit to a chemical test.42 The test does not violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant and although refusal re-
sults in automatic suspension, this suspension is pursuant to an
administrative action to which Miranda does not apply.43
A New York case44 that considered the question of whether
consulting with counsel would cause a delay in the test said:
Where the defendant wishes only to telephone his
lawyer or consult with a lawyer present in the station
house or immediately available there, no danger of
delay is posed. But to be sure, there can be no recogni-
tion of an absolute right to refuse the test, until a
lawyer reaches the scene. If the lawyer is not physically
present and cannot be reached promptly by telephone or
otherwise, the defendant may be required to elect be-
tween taking the test and submitting to revocation of
his license, without the aid of counsel.
45
If this view, which seems to be reasonable, were adopted by the
South Carolina courts, the accused's rights would be protected to
a reasonable extent without weakening the effectiveness of the
Implied Consent Law. 46
V. Tim TEST IN EVIDENCE
The alcohol-blood presumptive levels of intoxication set out in
the Implied Consent Law are lower than those previously ad-
hered to in South Carolina.47 If a reading is five one hundredths
42. Blow v. Commissioner, 164 N.W.2d 351 (S.D. 1969); Sharp v. Com-
monwealth, 414 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1967); State v. Trotter, 4 Conn. Civ. 185,
230 A.2d 618 (1967) ; State v. Oleson, 180 Neb. 546, 143 N.W.2d 917 (1966) ;
State v. Plourde, 3 Conn. Civ. 465, 217 A.2d 423 (1965); City of Toledo
v. Dielz, 3 Ohio St 2d 30, 209 N.E.2d 127 (1965), cert. denied 382
U.S. 956 (1965); Stensland v. Smith, 79 S.D. 651, 116 N.W.2d 653 (1962).
See Note, The South Dakota Implied Consent Statute Reviewed, 14 S.D.L.
Ryv. 376 (1969). See also Parker v. State, 397 S.W. 2d 853 (Tex. 1965)
(where no tests involved, defendant not entitled to acquittal on ground that
he had been denied right to counsel for four hours). But see City of Tacoma
v. Heafer, 67 Wash. 2d 733, 409 P.2d 867 (1966) (failure to allow defendant
an opportunity to call his lawyer until four hours after the arrest held viola-
tion of defendant's constitutional rights to counsel and due process even though
defendant refused to submit to chemical test).
43. Gouschalf v. Sueppel, 258 Ia. 1173, 140 N.W.2d 86 (1966).
44. People v. Gurnsey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 239 N.E.2d 351
(1968).
45. Id. at 229, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419, 239 N.E.2d at 353.
46. If the accused had an absolute right to counsel before the test could be
administered, delay by the attorney in getting to the testing site would work
in the accused's favor.
47. An individual was previously presumed to be under the influence when
his blood contained fifteen one-hundredths (0.157o) of one percent of alcohol.
1970]
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(.05%) of one percent or less, the defendant is conclusively pre-
sumed not to be under the influence of alcohol.48 A reading of
.06% through .09% puts the defendant in the "gray area". No
presumption results, but he may be charged.49 If the readings
show .10% or higher a presumption that the defendant was
under the influence will follow. This presumption is re-
buttable.50
The "Breathalyzer" is capable of giving accurate results when
the test is administered properly.51 The courts will probably
take notice of its accuracy since use of the machine has been
sanctioned by the Legislature, and defense attorneys will have a
difficult time trying to prove that the breathalyzer does not
accurately determine the alcoholic content of the blood.52 Most
will probably accept that fact and focus on the question of
whether the test was properly administered by a competent
operator. An effective cross-examination of an operator 8 who
has not done his homework or who in fact did not administer
the test properly may create enough doubt so that the jury will
not give it full weight. It may in some cases render the results
inadmissible.
The prosecution probably will be required to lay some founda-
tion before the results will be allowed into evidence. There is
yet no rule in South Carolina, but it is logical to assume that
48. The presumption applies only to alcohol. Since the breathalyzer does
not indicate the presence or lack of presence of narcotics, etc., a subject could,
conceivably, be legally charged under section 46-343 (which covers drugs as
well as alcohol) for "driving under the influence" even though the test results
indicated a presence less that 0.5% of alcohol in defendant's blood. S.C. CoDE
ANN. § 46-343 (Supp. 1969).
49. A conviction at this level seems unlikely unless the prosecution has a
great deal of additional evidence.
50. The test results are indicative of the subject's condition at the time of
the test. As a general rule, the time lapse between the arrest and the test has
little effect on the results. If there is a long period of time, possibly one hour
between the arrest and the test, the blood-alcohol level of the defendant will
usually decrease and, therefore, a lower reading in the defendant's favor would
result. This, however, would not hold true in all cases. Pure alcohol enters
the system at an average of one to two ounces per forty to seventy minutes.
If defendant could show that he had taken a couple of "stiff" drinks shortly
before the arrest and that the time between the arrest and the test was long
enough, he may be able to argue that he was still in the "gray area" (0.06-
0.09) at the time of the arrest and that his blood-alcohol level increased during
the time between the arrest and the test. The law, of course, requires that his
blood-alcohol level be 0.10% at the time of the violation for the presumption
to attach.
51. See R. DONIGAN, CHEMIcAL TEsTs AND THE LAW, at 56 (2d ed. 1966).
52. No case has been found in any state which has held or indicated that
the "Breathalyzer" is not capable of rendering accurate readings.
53. See Taylor, Determining the Competence of a Breathalyzer Operator,
9 CAw. B. J. 299 (1966).
[Vol. 22,
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standards similar to those set forth in a Washington case, State
v. Baker,54 will be required. In Baker the court said that:
[F]our basic requirements must be shown by the state
before the results of such tests may be admitted in evi-
dence, to wit:
(1) That the machine was properly checked and in
proper working order at the time of conducting the
test;
(2) that the chemicals employed were of the correct
kind and compounded in the proper proportions;
(3) that the subject had nothing in his mouth at the
time of the test and that he had taken no food or drink
within fifteen minutes prior to taking the test;
(4) that the test be given by a qualified operator and
in the proper manner. 5
Compliance with the first two standards can be demonstrated
in several ways. The State Law Enforcement Division (hereafter
referred to as SLED) will be periodically checking the machines,
and the chemicals will be spot checked by SLED chemists.5 6
These agents could testify as to the results of their maintenance
checks, and the courts may eventually presume that the ma-
chines have been properly maintained.
Also, the machine operator may conduct a simulator test with
a known solution immediately before or after testing the de-
fendant.5 7 If the machine readings equal the amount of alcohol
in the known solution, there is a clear indication that the ma-
chine is working properly and that the correct chemicals have
been used.58
The third standard requires that the defendant be observed
for fifteen minutes prior to the test, during which time he is
54. 56 Wash. 2d 846, 355 P2d 806 (1960). See also R. DONIGAN, CHEMcAL
TESTS AND THE LAW, at 56 (2d Ed. 1966), Watts, Some Observations on
Police-Administered Tests for Intoxication, 45 N.C.L. REv. 35, 83 (1966).
55. State v. Baker, 56 Wash. 2d 846, 852, 355 P.2d 806, 809 (1960).
56. It would be impossible to check each ampoule because such a procedure
would require each ampoule to be broken, thus rendering it unusable. The
rule will probably be that spot checking is sufficient to allow a presumption
that the proper chemicals were in the ampoules.
57. All persons who have been cerified by SLED have been instructed to
conduct a simulator test in all cases. Defense counsel should ascertain before
trial whether such test had been conducted.
58. The simulator test should be enough to comply with the first two
standards set forth in Baker, supra. Yet the court there, although making no
mention of such a test, seems to require more, i.e. a statement by SLED of
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allowed nothing to eat or drink. Compliance with this require-
ment insures that any alcohol that could possibly be concentrated
in the defendant's mouth would be completely dissipated before
the test is administered." Also, the defendant's mouth should be
checked for anything that may have absorbed some alcohol thus
keeping it concentrated in the mouth.60
To meet the fourth standard SLED has developed a checklist
for the operator's use. If followed closely, the chance of human
error is reduced to a minimum. This standard requires that the
test be given by a qualified person."' As a bare minimum, the
operator must have been trained and certified by SLED. The
defense may always challenge the qualifications of the operator
on cross-examination.62
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether the Implied Consent Law will fully accomplish its
intended purpose is a question that cannot be answered at this
time. A great deal will depend upon the answers the courts give
to the many questions left unanswered in this article. For ex-
ample, if State v. Smith were overruled, and "refusals" were not
admissible, the possibility of obtaining a conviction in a refusal
case would be slight. As a result, most persons would probably
refuse the test and take the ninety-day suspension. With the
lessened risk of conviction the anticipated deterrent effect of the
new law probably would be reduced.
If the courts were to go beyond the guidelines established in
the Baker case, and increase the amount of groundwork that
must be laid prior to admitting the test results, prosecution by
highway patrolmen may become impractical. Requirements
59. The author has participated in several experiments in this area. In one
instance he placed several drops of 100 proof bourbon on his tongue and im-
mediately blew into the machine. The result indicated 0.14% even though no
alcohol was in the bloodstream. Between 10 to 15 minutes later a second test
was administered and the reading was zero.
A similar experiment was then conducted except one and one-half ounces
of liquor was gargled. The initial reading was higher, about 0.30%, but it
returned to zero within fifteen minutes. The same result, except with a lower
initial reading, occurred when mouthwash was used instead of liquor.
60. For example: If the subject had a couple of drinks while chewing on
a cigar, the wet end of the cigar may absorb some of the alcohol. If he put
the cigar in his mouth and chewed on it just before blowing into the machine,
some of the alcohol from the cigar may have stayed in his mouth, thus causing
a higher reading.
61. See R. DONIGAN, CHEmiCAL TESTS AND THE LAW, at 88-105 (2d ed.
1966).
62. See note 18 supra.
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that are too stringent in the area of rendering assistance in ob-
taining an additional test may have a similar effect.
In spite of these and other possible loopholes the Implied
Consent Law, if administered properly by law enforcement per-
sonnel, will at least make people think twice before taking the
wheel after drinking. "Drunk drivers" will still be on the road
but hopefully in fewer numbers.
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